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Abstract 
Analyzing international negotiations among the member states of the European Union 
raises a number of analytical issues, especially in unusual circumstances such as the 
Eurozone crisis. Our article discusses these issues in the light of existing theory and 
informed by the empirical analyses assembled in this special issue. ‘National preferences’ 
or ideal points of the governments involved are driven by their domestic socio-economic 
and political conditions and institutions, the dimensionality of the negotiations, and 
strategic considerations. We then discuss how national preferences, states’ bargaining 
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informed, empirical analysis.  
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The nations engaged in building an Economic and Monetary Union in Europe 
(EMU) have embarked on an extraordinary process without recent parallel. They are not 
creating a federal union, for the component units remain sovereign nation states. They 
are not simply building an international organization, for the institutions of the EMU 
have powers far beyond that of existing international organizations, such as designing a 
common set of monetary and financial policies. The construction of this unique entity 
presents policymakers in the EMU’s member states with difficult decisions. These 
decisions have become all the more contentious since the Eurozone crisis exposed EMU’s 
structural problems. Because reform requires compromise, the negotiations over EMU 
reform have proven difficult and protracted. At the same time, EMU and attempts to 
reform it pose fascinating questions for scholars trying to understand the process.  
The essays in this special issue are set out to answer some of these questions in an 
effort to provide a better understanding of the politics of EMU. They focus on the 
negotiations over Eurozone crisis resolution and EMU reform. Taken together, the six 
essays present a full picture of these negotiations, from an analysis of national bargaining 
positions, through negotiation dynamics, to countries’ bargaining success. All 
contributions employ the new and versatile ‘EMU Positions’ dataset, which contains a 
comprehensive collection of member states’ and European Union (EU) institutions’ 
preferences, issue salience, and bargaining outcomes on 47 EMU proposals that were 
officially negotiated during the Eurozone crisis. The articles help us better understand 
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the negotiations over how to reform EMU and provide broader insights into the politics 
of European and international negotiations. 
In this concluding essay to the special issue, we suggest how the articles in this 
volume help us make sense of how EMU has evolved during the crisis, and how they 
help us analyze the complex politics of the EU more generally. We discuss the questions 
that a thorough analysis of intergovernmental negotiations needs to address, the answers 
that the contributions in this special issue give, and they fit in the wider literature on 
international bargaining in European politics and international relations. We start our 
discussion with the analysis of ‘national preferences,’ as represented by the estimation of 
national ideal points. We then discuss the bargaining process, focusing on sources of 
bargaining power, and bargaining dynamics. Our aim is to show how the contributions 
to this special issue add to our understanding on each of these issues, as well as the ways 
in which they can serve as starting points for future research.  
 
National preferences: Ideal-point estimation 
The starting point for analyzing inter-state interactions is determining the goals of 
national governments for these interactions – simply captured as ‘national preferences’ 
(Moravcsik, 1997). Of course, this is shorthand, for individuals, not nations, have 
preferences. Nonetheless, for the purposes of analyzing inter-state bargaining, it is 
reasonable – indeed, essential – to approximate the goals of each negotiating national 
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government.  These goals shape government bargaining positions at the negotiation table 
and influence whether and which bargain will be struck (Moravcsik, 1997; Putnam, 1988). 
Identifying national preferences – governments’ ‘ideal points’ – is no easy matter, 
however. It involves making assumptions about three sets of questions: First, how do 
domestic socio-economic and political factors affect national governments’ ideal points? 
Second, can these preferences be ordered spatially, and if so, along which dimension(s)? 
And finally, how do governments attempt to achieve their goals, given these preferences 
contingent and the wider strategic setting in which negotiations occur? Depending on the 
assumptions the analyst makes in answering each of these questions, the measured ideal 
points and strategies of national governments will vary. Estimating ideal points is thus 
ultimately an eminently theoretical enterprise, but also one that can be evaluated 
empirically – as the articles by Tarlea et al. (2019) and Wasserfallen and Lehner (2019) in 
this special issue do. 
 
Domestic sources of national bargaining positions 
What are the domestic sources of national governments’ ideal points? National 
preferences can be rooted in societal, ideological, and institutional considerations. 
Governments are responsible to their constituents, but there is a wide variety of 
potentially relevant constituents. They include voters, special interest groups, and 
bureaucrats themselves. Moreover, constituent preferences are mediated through 
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national social and political institutions. Estimating ideal points of national governments 
requires making decisions about how important one thinks interest groups, electoral 
pressures, partisan politics, ideology, and other factors are in affecting the goals of a 
government. There are different ways to go about this enterprise. Analysts who see 
special interests as core drivers of government preferences suggest that national ideal 
points vary depending on the extent to which domestic interest groups will be affected 
by the policy under consideration (e.g. Bailer et al., 2015; Frieden, 2002). Other scholars 
emphasize the role of public opinion as a crucial determinant of governments’ positions 
in international negotiations (e.g. Hagemann et al., 2017). With regard to ideology, party 
politics is often seen as key (e.g. Hagemann and Hoyland, 2008; Mattila, 2009). The 
analyst might begin by estimating the policy positions of different political parties 
regarding the issue at hand and assume that a government made up of several political 
parties has the policy preferences consistent with the weighted average of its constituent 
parties’ preferences.  
Finally, countries’ institutions matter in shaping expressed national preferences, 
because institutions determine how different societal interests influence national policy. 
For example, a large body of research shows that countries with democratic institutions 
are more likely to support trade liberalization in its various forms than autocracies (e.g. 
Copelovitch and Ohls, 2012; Milner and Kubota, 2005). But even within a body like the 
EU, which consists only of democracies, institutions vary. National parliaments, for 
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example, constrain governments’ room to maneuver in EU-level negotiations (Winzen, 
2012). And while it makes sense to treat these different sources of domestic preferences 
separately for analytical reasons, more often than not they will  interact with each other 
to jointly influence national negotiation positions (Finke, 2009). 
How important were each of these different explanatory factors in the European 
negotiations about EMU reform? Tarlea et al.’s (2019) contribution in this special issue 
evaluates this question. In line with political economy analyses of the Eurozone crisis 
(Frieden and Walter, 2017), it finds that countries’ ideal points about EMU reform have 
been strongly shaped by special interests, especially by those of the financial services 
industry. Countries with more exposed financial sectors were particularly favorable to 
more Europeanized solutions, as were countries with higher unemployment levels. 
Interestingly, although public opinion has been mobilized considerably by the Eurozone 
crisis (Hobolt, 2015), it did not shape governments’ negotiation positions. In contrast, 
domestic institutions mattered: countries with strong national parliaments were 
significantly more supportive of EMU reforms that kept core competences at the national 
level. The article demonstrates that national negotiating positions are likely to be shaped 
by those domestic actors most strongly and directly affected by the reforms in question. 
These groups are likely to vary by issue area: in EU negotiations about the refugee crisis, 
different societal actors are likely to matter than in negotiations over financial regulation, 
for example.  
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The findings demonstrate that domestic politics and domestic distributive 
concerns have a strong influence on national governments’ room to maneuver. Spelling 
out the conditions under which certain interests are more successful in shaping national 
negotiating positions therefore appears to be a fruitful avenue for future research. This 
may also require disaggregated analyses that also consider the ideal points of different 
parties, interest groups, and domestic institutions with regard to the issues at hand.  
 
Dimensionality 
The second aspect of analyzing national negotiation positions is the question of 
dimensionality. Are national preferences about the issue at hand aligned along one 
dimension, or are several dimensions concerned? What are these dimensions? Answering 
these questions is important, because a one-dimensional bargaining game looks different 
from a two- or multi-dimensional bargaining game. The number and nature of 
negotiating dimensions shape the negotiation dynamics and possibilities for 
compromise, yet existing research does not provide clear guidance on this issue (Lehner 
and Wasserfallen, 2019).i  
One of the fundamental issues in international negotiations is the question of how 
much to cooperate, a dimension that reflects the trade-off between national sovereignty 
and the benefits from international cooperation. The easiest way to think about this is 
that a group, a party, and ultimately the national government compares the expected 
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consequences of keeping decision-making power at the national level to the expected 
consequences of transferring the policy to international level. Trade policy can provide 
an example, in this instance of a policy long since Europeanized. A group in, say, Italy 
may expect Italian trade policy to be more favorable to its interests than European policy. 
However, Europe has greater bargaining power internationally than does Italy, and so 
may be able to conclude trade deals that overall benefit Italy more than if it were to 
negotiate by itself. Hence, in defining Italy’s negotiating position, the group’s views on 
the Europeanization of trade policy depends on the tradeoff between a more favorable 
policy, on the one hand, and greater international bargaining power, on the other 
(Frieden, 2004). 
The smaller the expected benefits of an international solution relative to a more 
nationalized one, the less attractive international cooperation will be. In Europe, this 
dimension reflects the choices between delegating greater or less power over a particular 
policy to the EU. If this is the only dimension, preferences over outcomes lead to 
preferences over the extent to which policy should be kept at the national level or be 
Europeanized. Much research on European politics shows that this is indeed a core 
dimension of conflict in European politics. However, some studies suggest that European 
negotiations are characterized not by a unidimensional ‘more-vs.-less integration’ 
bargaining space, but rather that national positions can usually be placed in a two-
dimensional bargaining space where the more-vs.-less integration conflict dimension is 
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complemented by the more traditional left-right dimension (Hix, 1999; Marks and 
Steenbergen, 2004). This matters, because the more dimensions come into play, the more 
likely it becomes that similar interest groups or political parties in two countries might 
have different views on Europeanization. Left governments that favor more 
redistribution may, for example, support Europeanization when they expect their 
country to benefit on net from a redistributive Europeanized policy but may oppose 
delegation to the European level when they expect their country to be a net contributor. 
The literature not only debates the number of dimensions, but also the nature of these 
dimensions. Especially in the context of the Eurozone crisis, some authors have argued 
for a more issue-specific approach that focuses explicitly on fiscal discipline and the 
distributive questions involved in Eurozone reform (Armingeon and Cranmer, 2017; 
Frieden and Walter, 2017).  
The contributions in this special issue, although they are based on the same data, 
vary in how they conceptualize the nature and number of dimensions in European 
negotiations over EMU reform. Tarlea et al.’s (2019) article conceptualizes government 
positions on a single dimension and classifies them as to whether they prefer more or less 
integration. Lehner and Wasserfallen (2019, see also the contribution by Degner and 
Leuffen (2019)) examine this issue in great detail and also identify one single systematic 
dimension of conflict. However, rather than more vs. less integration, they suggest that 
in the EMU negotiations, government positions depended upon their support for fiscal 
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transfers vs. fiscal discipline. In contrast, Bailer and Finke’s (2019) contribution 
conceptualizes the reform space along three dimensions: the level of transfers, the level 
of fiscal discipline (austerity), and the level of institutionalization. They argue that 
considering the interplay of these dimensions is of crucial relevance for understanding 
the bargaining dynamics in reforming the EMU. This divergence shows that different 
theoretical and empirical approaches can yield different conclusions about the 
dimensionality of the bargaining space.  
 
Strategic considerations 
Finally, national governments are likely to take the wider strategic setting into 
account when formulating their negotiating positions. This complicates the estimation of 
ideal points and the analysis of bargaining dynamics in two ways: First, countries’ 
revealed preferences in international negotiations may not reflect their true preferences. 
And second, strategic considerations may eliminate certain policy options from the 
discussion before they even make it to the bargaining table.ii  
With regard to revealed vs. true preferences, the approach pursued by the 
contributions in this special issue has been to treat the governments’ revealed goals 
regarding specific policies as approximations of their actual national ideal points. This is 
a standard approach in European politics research (e.g. Finke et al., 2012; Thomson et al., 
2006) and one that, in the absence of viable alternatives, is both pragmatic and productive, 
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especially in light of evidence that revealed preferences in European negotiations often 
coincide with sincere preferences (Bailer, 2011). It is also an approach that yields 
meaningful results, as the contributions in this special issue show.  
However, revealed preferences do not always mirror countries’ true preferences. 
Less powerful states may preemptively fall in line with more powerful states. Other states 
may free ride on more powerful states’ negotiating positions, because it allows them to 
achieve their preferred outcomes without having to openly fight for them. In the 
Eurozone crisis, for example, Germany is often seen as holding the most extreme position. 
But at various points in the Eurozone crisis, it became clear that a group of countries 
(sometimes referred to as ‘the Hanseatic League’) had at least as extreme, or even more 
extreme positions than Germany. States may also hide their true positions for strategic 
reasons (König et al., 2005). Moreover, linkages exist across different issues and 
international fora. Ample evidence exists, for example, that recipients of World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans are more likely to vote in line with the G7, and 
especially the United States, in the United Nations General Assembly (e.g. Dreher et al., 
2009). In the EU, with its many issue areas and multiple fora, such behavior also occurs 
frequently (König and Junge, 2009) . 
The second strategic complication is that powerful states can rule out certain 
policy options so that they never enter the agenda of official negotiations (Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1963). In the introductory piece to this special issue, Wasserfallen et al. (2019) 
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emphasize this phenomenon by distinguishing between potential and negotiated policy 
proposals. Indeed, one of the aspects of the Eurozone crisis that has most puzzled 
political economists is the unusual approach that the Eurozone has pursued (Copelovitch 
et al., 2016; Frieden, 2015; Frieden and Walter, 2017; Mody, 2018). Rather than sharing 
crisis resolution costs, for example by accepting debt restructuring or adjusting domestic 
economic policies, the creditor and surplus countries of the Eurozone have been 
successful in offloading most of the costs of the crisis onto the Eurozone’s debtor and 
deficit states. Proposals such as thoroughgoing debt restructuring or far-reaching reforms 
to the EMU’s architecture never made it to the bargaining table. Given the nature of the 
data, most of the contributions in this special issue neglect this issue and focus on the 
negotiated policy options.  
To the extent that these analyses cover the negotiations over the actual policy 
proposals under discussion, they yield interesting and important insights. Yet some of 
the puzzling findings, such as Lundgren et al.’s (2019) conclusion that Germany did not 
dictate the terms of Eurozone reforms, appear less puzzling when one considers that 
Germany may have influenced how the set of potential options was narrowed – as the 
authors discuss at length in their article. Degner and Leuffen’s (2019) contribution takes 
on this issue directly. Their analysis of France’s and Germany’s roles in EMU reform 
argues that as core players, both countries pre-selected issues from the set of potential 
policy options, so that the other member states were forced to position themselves only 
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with regard to the remaining, negotiated, options (see also Tsebelis and Hahm, 2014). 
Does this discussion imply that using revealed negotiating positions is a futile enterprise? 
No, but the limitations of the approach have to be taken into account when interpreting 
the results.  
 
The bargaining game: Bargaining power and dynamics 
Keeping the complexity of the estimation of national ideal points in mind, we now 
move to how national negotiating positions might be used to illuminate the bargaining 
game. When nation states bargain, they – like all bargainers – try to obtain an outcome as 
close as possible to their ideal point. But not all states will be equally successful in 
achieving that aim. This raises the questions: How do national preferences, states’ 
bargaining power, the bargaining context, and the bargaining dynamics jointly influence 
the bargaining outcome?  
Within the bargaining game, actors typically have different levels of bargaining 
power, defined as the ability to draw the outcome closer to one’s ideal point. Bargaining 
power is jointly determined by characteristics of the state itself, especially how much it 
wants to avoid negotiation failure, by the preference constellation of all actors at the 
bargaining table, and by the institutional setup of the bargaining game – such as the 
relevant decision rule, agenda control, and the wider institutional context. Although 




The reversion point 
At its core, bargaining power is a function of a government’s reversion point, that 
is, its valuation of what would happen in the absence of an agreement. iii   Because 
sovereign states will only settle for a bargained outcome if it is more desirable than the 
outcome that would prevail if the negotiations reached no conclusion, the reversion point 
determines how much governments are willing to compromise to avoid the reversion 
point.  
The less a governments wants or needs the agreement under negotiation, the more 
bargaining power it has (Keohane and Nye, 1977). The better off a government is in the 
absence of an agreement relative to a bargained outcome and the less it cares about the 
bargain, the more easily it can walk away from the negotiations, and this gives it 
bargaining power. By the same token, governments that would be left much worse off 
without a conclusion to the negotiations are in a weaker bargaining position, all else 
equal. A related factor is the time horizon of the government: the more quickly it needs 
action, the weaker its position (Rubinstein, 1982). The member state that can wait longer 
is likely to be in a superior negotiating position, especially if its counterpart member 
states face dire circumstances in the relatively short run. It is therefore not surprising that 
the contribution by Lundgren et al. (2019) finds that non-Eurozone members had more 
bargaining power than Eurozone member states and that states’ deep commitment to the 
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euro partly neutralized their influence. Nonetheless, it is surprising that their analyses 
suggest that issue importance and issue salience had no statistically significant effects on 
bargaining power. 
In many international negotiations, the reversion point is the status quo, the 
condition prevailing at the start of the interaction. This is particularly true when states 
bargain about establishing new or deeper forms of cooperation or integration. In these 
cases, a failure to reach a consensus means that the status quo of no or existing levels of 
cooperation will continue. In this kind of negotiation, the states that have most to gain 
from more international cooperation will, all else equal, have less bargaining power 
because they are more eager to conclude a deal, especially if the issue under negotiation 
is equally salient for all negotiating parties. Much of the literature on EU negotiations has 
examined bargaining power and bargaining dynamics in such contexts (e.g. Arregui and 
Thomson, 2009; Bailer, 2004, 2010; Golub, 2012, Schneider et al., 2010; Slapin, 2006; 
Thomson et al., 2006). One crucial and common assumption for analyzing these 
negotiations is that states will vote against any reform proposal that is further away from 
their ideal position than the status quo (see for example Finke and Bailer, 2019).  
Negotiations in the shadow of the Eurozone crisis, however, differed from this 
conventional setup in one crucial respect: More often than not, the reversion point in 
these negotiations was not a continuation of the status quo – an imperfect, yet stable 
European Monetary and Economic Union – but a breakup of the Eurozone, or even 
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financial chaos.  Although negotiations continue to revolve around establishing new 
cooperative schemes in such negotiations (in the Eurozone crisis, for example, issuing 
Eurobonds, creating a bailout fund, or designing a banking union), the reversion point is 
not the status quo, but an outcome that is extremely costly for some or even all member 
states. Rather than negotiating about how to distribute the gains from international 
cooperation, these negotiations are thus about how to distribute the costs of cooperation. 
This not only raises the stakes for all involved actors, but also weakens the bargaining 
power of those countries most at risk from the reversion point, especially as the costs 
associated with reversion point are often likely to vary considerably among member 
states.  The Brexit negotiations are a case in point. 
Understanding that negotiations occurred under the specter of a very costly 
reversion point helps explain the bargaining dynamic in much of the Eurozone debt 
crisis. As in most debt crises, debtor governments that had run out of funds and found 
themselves frozen out of international capital markets were under much more immediate 
pressure than governments of creditor countries. This asymmetry of the bargaining 
relationship helps explain both why creditors typically do better than debtors in debt 
negotiations more generally, and why this was also the case in the case of the Eurozone 
debt crisis more specifically (Frieden, 2015; Moschella, 2017). In line with this argument, 
Finke and Bailer’s contribution to this special issue finds that governments facing less 
financial market pressure during the crisis had more bargaining power than those 
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governments deeply embroiled in the crisis, and hence deeply in need of concluding the 
negotiations (see also Schimmelfennig, 2015). Understanding the role of the reversion 
point also explains why Germany and France, two countries not experiencing immediate 
market pressure, were able to become prominent actors in Eurozone reform (Degner and 
Leuffen (2019), see also Schild, 2013).  
Thinking about the reversion point is also relevant for analyzing the role that 
domestic constraints have on the bargaining power of international states. Much research 
in the tradition of two-level games has shown that more constrained states may enjoy an 
advantage in inter-state bargaining because their room for compromise is smaller than 
for states that face less domestic constraints (Putnam, 1988). For example, countries with 
more skeptical domestic ratification pivots are more hesitant to vote against further 
Europeanization (Hagemann et al., 2017) and therefore tend to be more successful in 
international negotiations (Slapin, 2006). There is also ample evidence that domestic 
politics influenced how the Eurozone crisis was managed (e.g. Bernhard and Leblang, 
2016; Schneider and Slantchev, 2018). However, the extent to which domestic institutional 
and political constraints, such as a Euroskeptic public, matter for a country’s bargaining 
power depends on how domestic veto players assess the reversion point relative to a 
bargaining solution.  
Domestic constraints are particularly powerful when influential domestic actors 
prefer the reversion point to certain negotiated outcomes. The Euroskeptic ‘Alternative 
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for Germany’ open campaign in favor of a German exit from the Eurozone is such an 
example, and is likely to have provided Germany with some added bargaining leverage 
on the European level. In contrast, domestic constraints have less bite when domestic 
veto players ultimately shy away from the reversion point. The 2015 Greek bailout 
referendum illustrates this point: Although national referendums are usually seen as a 
means to increase states’ bargaining power in international negotiations (Hug and König, 
2002), the Greek referendum against the EU’s proposed bailout extension package gave 
the Greek government no additional bargaining power. At first glance, this seems 
puzzling in light of the overwhelming rejection of the bailout package by 61% of Greek 
voters. However, this outcome can be understood as indicating that while opposed to the 
bailout package, Greeks – including those who voted ‘no’ in the bailout referendum – 
were even more opposed to a Greek exit from the Eurozone (Walter et al., 2018). When 
push came to shove and the Greek government was confronted with either accepting 
another tough bailout package or the reversion point, leaving the Eurozone, the Greek 
government acquiesced and accepted the negotiation outcome. In effect, the referendum 
weakened the Greek bargaining position further, because it revealed that the government 
was bluffing. Future research would thus benefit from including the reversion point more 
explicitly into the analysis of domestic constraints on international negotiation outcomes. 
Given the importance of the reversion point, we see two additional fruitful 
avenues for future research. First, bargaining power based on the reversion point should 
19 
 
matter even before formal negotiations begin. As discussed above, powerful states may 
use this power to remove certain outcomes from the menu of options even before the 
negotiations start. Future research could improve our understanding of the role of the 
reversion point and bargaining power more generally by explicitly incorporating the 
issue-selection phase into analyses of bargaining power and bargaining outcomes. This 
may require more qualitative approaches, such as the analysis in this special issue by 
Degner and Leuffen (2019), because it is more difficult to quantify instances where issues 
never officially entered the negotiations. A second avenue for future research is to better 
conceptualize and measure the exposure of states to the reversion point. This is less 
straightforward than conceptualizing exposure to the status quo and subject to more 
uncertainty because of the need to construct a counterfactual. Given the centrality of the 
reversion point especially during crisis bargaining, however, more research on how to 
tackle this issue seems promising. 
 
Preference constellations and decision rules 
A second source of bargaining power is the preference constellation among the 
bargaining actors. As is the case for most politics, a central consideration in attempting 
to explain EU negotiation outcomes is the role of the pivotal voter. This is the actor – in 
this case usually the pivotal nation-state – whose support is necessary to conclude an 
agreement under a given decision rule and given distribution of preferences (Krehbiel, 
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1998). When votes are decided by majority rule, the pivotal voter corresponds to the 
median voter because the median voter is a necessary and sufficient member of all 
minimum winning coalitions (Krehbiel, 2006). Thinking about political pivots is of more 
general institutional relevance, however, because it allows us to generalize from the 
specific median voter case. Because the pivotal voter’s support is necessary to 
successfully conclude an agreement, the pivot enjoys enhanced bargaining power.  
Who the pivotal country is depends on the configuration of the ideal point of all 
the actors involved in the negotiation and on the decision rule by which decisions are 
taken in a negotiation. This requires identifying the involved actors, the resulting 
preference constellation, and the relevant decision rule. In the negotiations studied in this 
special issue, for example, the set of actors, the preference constellations, and the decision 
rules varied widely.  
Most major decisions about EMU crisis management and reform required 
unanimous consent of all actors by a varying array of actors: Some decisions were taken 
by all EU member states through Council decisions (for example the first Greek bailout 
program). Others (most decisions regarding the Fiscal Compact) involved all member 
states but used a less institutionalized decision-making process whose outcome was 
intergovernmental treaties, rather than EU legislation. Finally, some unanimous 
decisions were taken by a subset of EU members, most notably the members of the 
Eurogroup (for example, most decisions taken with regard to the European Financial 
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Stability Facility or the European Stability Mechanism). Under unanimous decision rules, 
every country can be pivotal. Because any country can veto a proposal that does not make 
it better off than the reversion point under unanimity rule, the country with the most 
extreme ideal point is pivotal – even if all other countries would underwrite a 
compromise. Finding an agreement therefore requires all states to accommodate the 
pivotal country’s extreme position.  
Some reform decisions, however, especially about the Six-Pack and many 
decisions on Banking Union, were decided using the EU’s standard ordinary legislature 
procedure.iv  This is a procedure in which the Council (i.e. the EU member states) and the 
European Parliament jointly decide on a proposal first put forth by the European 
Commission. As a result, all member states and the European Parliament constitute 
potential pivots. Things become more complicated, however because within the Council, 
decisions are taken by qualified majority voting (QMV). This means that the identity of 
the pivotal country depends on precisely what kind of majority is necessary for the 
decision to be adopted. With QMV, the pivotal country is the one placed on the 
dimension of interest right at the point that constitutes the qualified majority. Identifying 
the pivot in QMV is more complex, however, when the votes of the negotiating states are 
weighted, as they are in the Council of the European Union where larger states have more 
votes than smaller states. Larger countries are therefore more likely than smaller ones to 
turn into the pivotal voter. The result is that the outcome of the negotiations tends to lie 
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closer to the ideal point of those states with more voting power (Arregui and Thomson, 
2009; Bailer, 2004).v  
This discussion underscores that it matters both where the states’ ideal points are 
located relative to all other negotiating parties’ ideal points and by which rule decisions 
are taken. This point is highlighted by two contributions in this special issue, Lundgren 
et al. (2019) and Finke and Bailer (2019). The interplay between the preference 
constellation and the type of decision rule – in this case unanimity or QMV – is 
demonstrated by Lundgren et al., which show that states whose preferences are closely 
located to the mean ideal point of all negotiating partners were much more likely to 
achieve their preferred outcome under QMV than under unanimity.  
The significant variation in actors, preference constellation, and decision rules 
covered by the ‘EMU Choices’ dataset provides ample room for future analyses to explore 
these issues in future research beyond the contributions in this special issue. For example, 
the institutional structure of the EU profoundly affects the outcome of bargaining among 
its member states in a multitude of ways, most of them complex and all of them difficult 
to analyze. A wealth of theoretical and empirical evidence demonstrates the importance 
of institutional configurations in affecting the making of national and international 
policy. Much debate revolves around exactly how institutions affect policy, and this is 
particularly true for the EU which is far more richly institutionalized than inter-state 
relations more generally, but less institutionally constrained than most democratic nation 
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states. This makes it both crucial and fascinating to analyze the impact of European 
institutions and their interplay with actors and preference constellations on negotiation 
outcomes. By providing detailed information about the participants in each round of 
negotiations, the data generated by the ‘EMU Choices’ project can help shed light on these 
issues. Moreover, it includes information on the ideal points of actors not directly at the 
negotiating table, such as non-Eurozone EU members or other EU institutions involved 
in Eurozone crisis management but without direct decision-making power in 
intergovernmental negotiations, such as the European Central Bank. The dataset thus 
provides a rich resource to explore decision-making in a complex institutional structure 
such as the EU. 
 
Agenda control and issue linkage 
A final issue that shapes the dynamics and outcomes of negotiations is the role of 
agenda control. We can think of control of the agenda as determining what issues are 
available to negotiate, and in what order. This can affect importantly how governments 
act to achieve their goals and gives the agenda-setter considerable influence over the 
bargaining outcome (Tsebelis, 2002). 
As discussed above, one form of agenda control is the ability to put certain issues 
off or onto the EU’s agenda, a type of agenda control that some observers attribute to 
France and Germany (e.g. Degner and Leuffen, 2019; Schild, 2013). The more 
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institutionalized agenda-setter in the European context is the European Commission, 
which has the unilateral power to formally initiate legislation in the European legislative 
process. This is a powerful tool that often allows the Commission to move legislative 
outcomes closer to its ideal point (e.g. Hartlapp et al., 2014). Nonetheless, the extent to 
which this formal agenda-setting power translates into actual influence over legislative 
outcomes is contested (Kreppel and Oztas, 2017). With regard to EU decision-making 
during the Eurozone crisis, some argue that the Commission has been able to set the 
agenda on certain issues related to EMU reform, especially when decisions were taken in 
the context of the EU’s highly institutionalized ordinary legislative procedure (Dinan, 
2012). This is also in line with Lundgren et al.’s (2019) findings that bargaining outcomes 
were significantly closer to those states whose preferences were aligned with the 
commission’s ideal point, especially when decisions were taken via ordinary legislative 
procedure. Others argue that the move away from the community method towards more 
intergovernmental bargaining has weakened the Commission (Chang, 2013). Finke and 
Bailer’s (2019) contribution to this special issue reconciles these two views and shows that 
the Commission retained a powerful agenda-setting role when decisions are taken in the 
EU’s formalized legislative setting, but that the Commission became almost irrelevant in 
intergovernmental negotiations that resulted in international treaties.  
Agenda control can also be understood more widely, including the question of 
which proposal is put to a vote or the order in which decisions are made. For example, 
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we can imagine that governments might vote differently on proposed national 
contributions to a common budget if they had previously decided how to spend the 
money (and vice versa). Such agenda-setting powers are particularly useful in a multi-
faceted arrangement such as the EU and its monetary union, because there are likely to 
be linkages across issue areas that could allow governments to use their influence in one 
realm to affect bargaining in another. Negotiators can tie together two issues that are not 
inherently connected – immigration and funds for regional development, for example. 
While this can make bargaining more complicated, as governments take into account the 
effects of the outcome on two dimensions, it can also allow for trades across issue area. A 
member state that cares more about immigration, for example, can make concessions on 
regional funds to get more of what it wants on immigration, and vice versa.  
Linkage politics is a well-established component of both domestic and 
international politics, and it is important in the EU as well. More generally, they take 
place in a richly institutionalized environment, both domestically and regionally. 
National political institutions of nation states, and the institutions of the EU, play a major 
role in affecting the outcome of bargaining among the member states. While the 
contributions in this special issue focus only on issues related to the problems bedeviling 
EMU, a promising avenue for future research is hence to explore how the negotiations 
about EMU reform were embedded and linked with other EU issues.  
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Both existing theory and the empirical evidence presented in this special issue 
demonstrate the calculations necessary to understand bargaining among the nation states 
of the EU. These calculations include determining the bargaining power of the principal 
actors, which is in turn a function of the reversion point and patience of the national 
governments. Into this must be factored the array of preferences, the institutional 
decision rules, agenda control, and the possibility of issue linkage. The process is complex 
and its analysis equally complex, but as the articles in this special issue indicate, the 
rewards include a much clearer sense of the sources of EU collective decisions.       
 
Intergovernmental and intra-European bargaining 
The European Union occupies a fascinating middle ground between the 
institution-poor bargaining environment within which most inter-state relations take 
place, on the one hand, and the highly institutionalized environment within which 
domestic political bargaining occurs. This middle ground raises theoretically and 
analytically important questions about how best to understand negotiations among the 
member states of the EU.  
Models of bargaining between nation states typically assume that there is no 
overarching institution that can enforce agreements that are made – for the simple reason 
that there are few or no such institutions in reality. Even if there are interests in common 
between two countries, each government has to be concerned about the willingness and 
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ability of its interlocutor to carry out the agreement reached. The credibility of the 
commitments made is crucial to inter-state bargaining, which means that information 
about the true intentions and resources of each side are central. Bargaining models in 
international politics – such as the canonical bargaining model of war (Fearon, 1995; 
Reiter, 2003) – place informational problems at the center of their analysis. For 
governments to arrive at stable agreements they need some assurance that the 
agreements will be carried out; for this, they need accurate information about each other’s 
intentions and abilities. Scholars in this arena, therefore, often regard international 
institutions as essential to help mitigate the informational problems that bedevil 
international bargaining (Keohane, 1984). 
Domestic political bargaining is very different, for in stable democratic societies it 
takes place in a highly institutionalized setting. While agreements can always be reneged 
upon, models of domestic political negotiations typically assume that all parties know 
the goals and strength of their interlocutors with quite a bit of precision. In this context, 
the more relevant consideration is whether there are potential gains from trade across 
issue areas – linkage politics – that can be exploited for mutual benefit.  
The European Union has features of both inter-state and domestic political 
bargaining. On the one hand, it is made up of sovereign nation states, whose 
representatives make the most important decisions about EU policy. On the other hand, 
it is highly institutionalized – not as highly as most developed democracies, but not that 
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far behind – and its core members have worked closely together for decades. Not 
surprisingly, a fruitful research program has employed legislative bargaining models 
developed for the national bargaining context to analyze EU politics (see Finke and Bailer, 
2019; Thomson et al., 2006). 
This implies that the nature of bargaining in the EU shares some characteristics of 
inter-state bargaining and other characteristics of domestic bargaining. It is interesting to 
speculate about circumstances that heighten one or the other feature of EU bargaining. 
Certainly, in the Eurozone crisis, it appears that inter-state negotiations dominated the 
proceedings, and that questions about the credibility of the commitments made by debtor 
and creditor states alike were central to the disagreements. However, other European 
policy areas look much more like the stuff of domestic politics. A promising area for 
future research is to examine the extent to which political negotiations within the EU most 
resemble inter-state bargaining or domestic politics – or, perhaps more usefully, under 
what circumstances the tools of analysis of these two domains are appropriate for 
understanding the EU. 
 
Conclusion 
The member states of Europe’s EMU face some serious problems. The euro has 
been in trouble for over a decade and attempts to reform it continue to face major 
obstacles. For scholars, observers, and practitioners, it is important to understand the 
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dynamics of negotiations within EMU. A clear analysis of how these negotiations have 
taken place in the past is essential to formulating a clear understanding of where the 
political economy of EMU stands today, and where it might go in the future. 
This volume makes a major step forward in establishing the appropriate 
theoretical and empirical tools for analyzing the politics of EMU and the EU more 
generally. The articles in this special issue provide a clear, theoretically informed, 
approach to estimating the preferences of national governments as they bargain over the 
structure and functioning of the monetary union. They present systematic analyses of 
how that bargaining has taken place, and why it has arrived at the observed outcomes. 
These articles, and the theory and data upon which they are based, also provide a firm 
foundation for further research aimed at understanding how the member states of the EU 








Armingeon K and Cranmer S (2017) Position Taking in the Euro Crisis. European Journal 
of Public Policy. 
Arregui J and Thomson R (2009) States’ bargaining success in the European Union. 
Journal of European Public Policy 16(5): 655–676. 
Bachrach P and Baratz MS (1963) Decisions and nondecisions: An analytical framework. 
American political science review 57(3): 632–642. 
Bailer S (2004) Bargaining Success in the European Union The Impact of Exogenous and 
Endogenous Power Resources. European Union Politics 5(1): 99–123. 
Bailer S (2010) What factors determine bargaining power and success in EU 
negotiations? Journal of European Public Policy 17(5): 743–757. 
Bailer S (2011) Structural, domestic, and strategic interests in the European Union: 
negotiation positions in the Council of Ministers. Negotiation Journal 27(4).: 447–475. 
Bailer S, Mattila M and Schneider G (2015) Money makes the EU go round: The 
objective foundations of conflict in the Council of Ministers. JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies 53(3): 437–456. 
Bailey MA, Strezhnev A and Voeten E (2017) Estimating dynamic state preferences from 
United Nations voting data. Journal of Conflict Resolution 61(2): 430–456. 
Bernhard WT and Leblang D (2016) Sovereign Debt, Migration Pressure, and 
31 
 
Government Survival. Comparative Political Studies 
Chang M (2013) Fiscal policy coordination and the future of the community method. 
Journal of European Integration 35(3): 255–269. 
Copelovitch M (2010a) Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy 
of IMF Lending. International Studies Quarterly 54(1): 49–77. 
Copelovitch M (2010b) The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Copelovitch M and Ohls D (2012) Trade, institutions, and the timing of GATT/WTO 
accession in post-colonial states. The Review of International Organizations 7(1): 81–
107. 
Copelovitch M, Frieden J and Walter S (2016) The Political Economy of the Eurozone 
Crisis. Comparative Political Studies 49(7): 811–840. 
Degner, H and Leuffen D (2019).  Franco-German Cooperation and the Rescuing of the 
Eurozone. European Union Politics  
Dinan D (2012) Governance and institutions: impact of the escalating crisis. JCMS: 
Journal of Common Market Studies 50: 85–98. 
Dreher A, Sturm J-E and Vreeland J (2009) Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in 
the United Nations Security Council. European Economic Review 53(7): 742–757. 




Finke D (2009) Domestic Politics and European Treaty Reform: Understanding the 
Dynamics of Governmental Position-Taking. European Union Politics 10(4): 482–506.  
Finke, D and Bailer S (2019) Crisis Bargaining in the European Union. Agenda, Veto, or 
Economic Power? European Union Politics 
Finke D, König T, Proksch S-O, et al. (2012) Reforming the European Union: realizing the 
impossible. Princeton University Press. 
Frieden J (2002) Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and 
European Monetary Integration. International Organization 56(4): 831–860. 
Frieden J (2004) One Europe, one vote? The political economy of European union 
representation in international organizations. European Union Politics 5(2): 261–276. 
Frieden J (2015) The political economy of adjustment and rebalancing. Journal of 
International Money and Finance 52: 4–14. 
Frieden J and Walter S (2017) Understanding the Political Economy of the Eurozone 
Crisis. Annual Review of Political Science 20(1): 371–390. 
Golub J (2012) How the European Union does not work: national bargaining success in 
the Council of Ministers. Journal of European Public Policy 19(9): 1294–1315. 
Hagemann S and Hoyland B (2008) Parties in the Council? Journal of European Public 
Policy 15(8): 1205–1221. 
Hagemann S, Hobolt SB and Wratil C (2017) Government responsiveness in the 




Hartlapp M, Metz J and Rauh C (2014) Which policy for Europe?: power and conflict inside 
the European Commission. OUP Oxford. 
Hix S (1999) Dimensions and alignments in European Union politics: Cognitive 
constraints and partisan responses. European Journal of Political Research 35(1): 69–
106. 
Hobolt SB (2015) Public attitudes towards the Euro crisis. Democratic politics in a 
European Union under stress: 48–66. 
Hug S and König T (2002) In View of Ratification: Governmental Preferences and 
Domestic Constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference. 
International Organization 56(2): 447–476.  
Keohane R (1984) After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Keohane R and Nye J (1977) Power and interdependence: World politics in transition.  
König T and Junge D (2009) Why don’t veto players use their power? European Union 
Politics 10(4): 507–534. 
König T, Finke D and Daimer S (2005) Ignoring the non-ignorables? Missingness and 
missing positions. European Union Politics 6(3): 269–290. 
Krehbiel K (1998) Pivotal Politics: A Theory of US Lawmaking. University of Chicago Press. 
Krehbiel K (2006) Pivots. In: The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. 
34 
 
Kreppel A and Oztas B (2017) Leading the band or just playing the tune? Reassessing 
the agenda-setting powers of the European Commission. Comparative Political 
Studies 50(8): 1118–1150. 
Lehner T and Wasserfallen F (2019) Political Conflict in the Reform of the 
Eurozone. European Union Politics 
Lim DYM and Vreeland JR (2013) Regional organizations and international politics: 
Japanese influence over the Asian Development Bank and the UN Security Council. 
World Politics 65(1): 34–72. 
Lundgren M , Bailer S, Dellmuth L, Tallberg J, and Tarlea S (2019) Bargaining Success in 
the Reform of the Eurozone. European Union Politics 
Marks G and Steenbergen MR (2004) Introduction: Models of political conflict in the 
European Union. In: European integration and political conflict. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Mattila M (2009) Roll call analysis of voting in the European Union Council of Ministers 
after the 2004 enlargement. European Journal of Political Research 48(6): 840–857. 
Milner H and Kubota K (2005) Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade 
Policy in Developing Countries. International Organization 59(4): 107–144. 
Mody A (2018) Eurotragedy: A Drama in Nine Acts. Oxford University Press. 
Moravcsik A (1997) Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international 
politics. International Organization 51(04): 513–553. 
35 
 
Moschella M (2017) When Some Are More Equal than Others: National Parliaments and 
Intergovernmental Bailout Negotiations in the Eurozone. Government and Opposition 
52(2).: 239–265. 
Putnam RD (1988) Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. 
International Organization 42(3): 427–460. 
Reiter D (2003) Exploring the bargaining model of war. Perspectives on Politics 1(1): 27–
43. 
Rubinstein A (1982) Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica: Journal of 
the Econometric Society: 97–109. 
Schild J (2013) Leadership in hard times: Germany, France, and the management of the 
eurozone crisis. German Politics & Society 31(1): 24–47. 
Schimmelfennig F (2015) Liberal intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis. Journal 
of European Public Policy 22(2): 177–195. 
Schneider C and Slantchev B (2018) The Domestic Politics of International Cooperation: 
Germany and the European Debt Crisis. International Organization 72(1): 1–31. 
Schneider G, Finke D and Bailer S (2010) Bargaining Power in the European Union: An 
Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models. Political Studies 58(1).: 85–103. 
Signorino CS and Ritter JM (1999) Tau-b or not tau-b: Measuring the similarity of 
foreign policy positions. International Studies Quarterly 43(1): 115–144. 
Slapin JB (2006) Who Is Powerful? European Union Politics 7(1): 51–76. 
36 
 
Tarlea S, Bailer S, Degner H, Dellmuth L, Leuffen D, Lundgren M, Tallberg J and 
Wasserfallen F (2019) Explaining Governmental Preferences on Economic and 
Monetary Union Reform. European Union Politics 
Thomson R, Stokman FN, Achen CH, et al. (2006) The European union decides. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Tsebelis G (2002) Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Tsebelis G and Hahm H (2014) Suspending vetoes: how the euro countries achieved 
unanimity in the fiscal compact. Journal of European Public Policy 21(10).: 1388–1411. 
Walter S, Dinas E, Jurado I, et al. (2018) Noncooperation by Popular Vote: Expectations, 
Foreign Intervention, and the Vote in the 2015 Greek Bailout Referendum. 
International Organization. 72(4): 964-996 
Wasserfallen F, Leuffen D, Kudrna Z and Degner D (2019) Analysing European Union 
Decision-Making during the Eurozone Crisis with New Data  European Union 
Politics 
Winzen T (2012) National parliamentary control of European Union affairs: A cross-









i For a discussion of this issue in a global setting, see for example (Bailey et al., 2017; Signorino and Ritter, 
1999). 
ii It can be extremely difficult to differentiate between preferences and strategies. The issue has long been 
debated both in the general political-economy literature and in International Relations. See, for example, 
Frieden (1999). 
iii The reversion point is also known as 'disagreement value'. 
iv The Online appendix by Lundgren et al. (2019) provides a useful overview. 
v This is a feature that is not unique to the EU but can also be found in other international organizations 
such as the IMF. This is a feature that is not unique to the EU, but can also be found in other international 
organizations. For example, the weighted voting rules in international financial institutions, such as the 
IMF or the Asian Development Bank, gives the institutions’ largest shareholders a disproportionally large 
share of votes and moves lending decisions in their favor (Copelovitch, 2010a,b; Lim and Vreeland 2013). 
                                               
